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Any local development process needs financial support. The nature and means of this 
support could be varied, as well as controversial. This chapter strives to present the 
different experiences, pinpoint the major issues and draw some methodological 
orientations that seem applicable to most situations. The chapter concentrates on 
financial services and its role in rural entrepreneurial development. 
1. Typology of rural finance systems and history in western Africa 
1.1 Agricultural credit through national banks and credit funds 
Attempts to set up “modern” agricultural credit systems are actually as old as the 
colonial era. These attempts consisted of duplicating French models of agricultural 
credit funds in the colonies. These systems took the form of massive and lax credit 
provided by local companies during the 1910s, or of mutual funds (solidarity 
collateral) since as early as 1956 in Cameroon. 
 
The main problem of credit in Africa has always been collateral, since the usual guarantees existing in 
Europe (land, residential or industrial buildings, livestock, stocks of goods, heavy equipment and 
machinery, etc.) are hardly applicable. This has accounted for the most failures of classical banking 
schemes. Therefore, other forms of guarantee (moral guarantee, solidarity) have been resorted to and 


















With independence, development banks were created though they were not interested 
in agricultural credit (despite offering traditional services supporting some 
commercialisation campaigns). 
National agricultural credit banks and funds were then created: CNCA in Niger (1967), 
CNCA in Togo (1967), BNDA in Cote d’Ivoire (1968), CNCA in Benin (1975), CNCA in 
Burkina Faso (1980), BNDA in Mali (1981), CNCA in Senegal (1984). 
These banks granted loans either directly to the beneficiaries (individuals, companies 
or farmers’ groups, co-operatives) or through development projects or development 
companies. A review of these different experiences in west Africa in the early 1990s 
highlighted a variety of problems: bankruptcy (in Niger) and critical situations in 
many banks (Togo, Cote d’Ivoire, Senegal), volatile balances and a quasi-exclusive 
concentration on cotton areas (in the case of Burkina Faso and Mali). 
The causes of these situations have been numerous: loans granted according to 
political rather than technical criteria, project managers lacking professionalism, 
burdensome and ill-adapted procedures, exaggerated operation costs and salaries in 
the banks, over-centralisation, inadequate strategies in the event of low yielding crops 
and certain farmers not repaying loans. Almost all of these banks were also 
characterised by heavily subsidised loan policies and ignoring other financial 
products, like savings facilities. 
 
Farmers show solidarity (as groups) and for several reasons farmers often did not repay these loans. 
Thus, it becomes socially acceptable  not to pay back loans provided by government banks and 
therefore difficult for banks to recover their money. 
 
Two situations where recovery rates have been high are worth mentioning: 
•  In cotton areas, the loan recovery rates have reached nearly 100% over the past 30 
years. This exceptional situation can be explained by the organised and 
monopolistic nature of the commodity chain (from seed supply to processing and 
sales on the world market) and by a sound knowledge of the producers and their 
needs (either directly or through village associations). 
A direct levy at the commercialisation level is very efficient since the debtor can 
sell only on a controlled basis through the cotton company. Any attempt to bypass 
the system (for example selling elsewhere) results in the cessation of further 
supply and credit for the farmer from then on. Such conditions do not exist for 
many products (another example is sugar cane). 
•  In areas where groundnuts are grown, particularly in Senegal, integrated credit 
systems worked well on a large scale for more than ten years up until the 1980s. 
Credit was granted to co-operatives, which were also in charge of 
commercialisation. Unlike the situation with cotton, the relationship between 
credit and commercialisation was indirect. At the end of each planting season, 
profit and loss accounts would be issued by the co-operatives, showing benefits 
and arrears (outstanding payments). Should a co-operative show a 300 000 F.CFA 
profit and 100 000 F.CFA unpaid, the bank where both accounts were held would 
consider only 200 000 F.CFA as profit. Shareholders of the co-operative would 
then be liable and share together the loss incurred owing to outstanding payments 
(principle of joint and several guarantees). This guarantee was not merely a moral 
guarantee as the profit resulted from commercial activities. Unfortunately, this 
system became perverted and faced degradation. Local influential people and 
board members systematically covered the loss with ever-decreasing benefits to the shareholders. For the system to work, profit would have had tobe much higher 
than the amount of outstanding payments. If the latter was high (owing to a bad 
yielding season, or the farmers' lack of willingness to pay back loans), an overall 
non-payment movement was quickly triggered along with a series of rebates and 
moratoriums, which ultimately resulted in bankruptcy (Senegal in the 1980s). 
 
Transparency and strictness may help: 
In Niger during the early 1970s it was clearly demonstrated that perversion of the system is avoidable if 
there is transparency and strict application of rules. Equally, the level of solidarity (joint and several 
guarantees) must be socially manageable (one village or one ward, and not several distant communities 
involved in one co-operative). A total blockade (and not simply reduction) of the shareholders benefits 
must be implemented until repayments are fully recovered. 
 
Solutions that can make the situation worse: 
Rebate is a cancellation of part of the debts, for example, it could be enacted in a  low yielding season. 
Usually, if the next season is also mediocre, the farmers will demand another rebate and may stop 
repaying (payments strike). 
Payments may also be postponed to the following years (moratorium). Often, farmers facing regular 
payments plus moratorium payments are inclined to think that they will never be able to pay the entire 
debt. This may lead to them not repaying at all , as they may be facing other problems. There is always 
the hope that the government will decide on a general write-off. Psychological and political issues as 
well as the concept of threshold are important in the field of credit. 
 
1.2 Agricultural credit through projects 
Projects or regional development structures often play an important role in rural 
credit, either as intermediaries for the national banks and credit funds, or as 
independents (with the aid of external funds). The problems discussed earlier do 
occur, and are often aggravated by a number of factors: 
•  Lack of competence on the part of project managers (who are usually agricultural 
operators interested in credit distribution rather than in loan recovery). 
•  Lack of independence on the part of the credit officers vis-à-vis extension and 
supply. 
•  Lack of concern about the long-term sustainability of the credit system. The 
objective is to distribute inputs and equipment and then exhaust a fund rather than 
to find a financial equilibrium. With such a perspective low loan recovery rates 
are not a concern. 
1.3 Savings and credit co-operatives (COOPECs and Credit Unions) 
These institutions have different names: “caisses populaires” (Burkina Faso, 
Cameroon, Zaire), “caisses rurales d’épargne et de prêts” (Côte d’Ivoire), “banques 
populaires” (Rwanda), and so on. In western Africa COOPECs started to appear 
during the 1970s. They were introduced earlier in eastern Africa (known as credit 
unions). The motivation was to introduce self-help financial institutions, to decrease 
transaction costs and to ensure that people that normally would have no access to 
financial services do get access. 
New local co-operatives were created during the late 1980s (Mali, Burundi, Senegal, 
Congo, Guinea) in response to the degradation of centralised systems for agricultural credit (CNCA, BNDA). International sponsors also became increasingly interested in 
alternative ways of organising savings and credit. 
The use of such alternative systems have demonstrated the following:  
•  Promoting savings has been successful: despite past scepticism concerning the 
possibility of promoting monetary savings by smallholders with limited revenues, 
all experiences have proved that savings activities have been significant. 
•   There is a diversity of needs: 
•  The need to set some money aside to protect oneself firstly against 
hazards and losses (theft, fire, termites, etc.), and secondly against 
excessive personal expenses or external demands (parents, friends, 
neighbours), which are is easier to resist when no money is 
immediately available 
•  The need for available liquidity to face life's necessities and shocks 
(disease, death, ceremonies, etc.) 
•  The need for small loans (house improvement, social needs, inputs for 
production, etc.) 
•  The need to earn interest on this saved money, even though such 
remuneration is often modest 
•  The link between savings and credit varies according to experience: credit can be 
quasi-simultaneous with savings, or it can come only after a long preparatory 
phase (often 1 or 2 years). It can represent only a small part of savings (10 to 
20%) or conversely more than 50%. 
•  Loan recovery rates have been satisfactory where savings were part of the 
programme (often higher than 90%), although there have been increasing delays 
and outstanding payments (as well as embezzlement, as has been the case in 
certain co-operatives in southern Cameroon) even when it concerns the farmers’ 
savings. 
•   Requests for credit often prioritise social needs (housing, health care, education), 
rather than productive investments. 
•  Co-operatives with a non-homogeneous social base, where there is a tendency to 
use the farmers’ savings to generate credit for local businesses, often result in 
outstanding payments. Farmers generally ask for small loans. 
•  A large part of savings can ultimately be injected into classical banking systems, 
which favour urban areas. The money is rarely injected back into the rural 
economy through credit. 
•  This type of organisation is often proposed from the outside. Original members 
tend to lose control, while only economic criteria are applied along with an 
increasing gap between the central organisation and local groups. 
•  Training often favours a transfer of models rather than support for the invention of 
new types of organisations. 
•  It is difficult for COOPECs to achieve financial equilibrium, even after 10 or 15 
years of operation. Although commendable in that there is more autonomy vis-à-
vis external funds, the search for such balance may have undesirable effects such 
as limitations to both training and control costs, and a search for security with 
non-risk investments and loans. 
 
The COOPEC model also raises some concerns: 
•  National organisations (unions) are costly and heavy. •  There is a tendency to favour development at top levels, for example, through the 
creation of a second tier or federative bank which is actually a commercial bank. 
In many cases these institutions resulted in top heavy structures and in a way did 
not adhere to the essence of co-operative ventures, thus, that it should be member 
driven. 
•  It seems difficult to recycle local savings into credit, which would benefit local 
projects. 
 
Popular banks of Rwanda 
These are typical examples of a successful savings function. About US$ 30 million have been saved, 
and about 150 popular banks created in 25 years and more than 33% of all Rwandese families are 
involved. 
This success can be explained by 
•  an enthusiastic welcome by the population to the creation of popular banks in 1975 (people being 
very interested in a secure saving system); 
•  a favourable institutional environment: the state, the central bank and the administration supported 
the action and the approach  used without interfering, which guaranteed independence and 
management autonomy. 
In addition, some simple methodological principles were applied: 
•  The first banks were created in a region with a history of co-operative development (church 
initiatives, local savings co-operatives, etc.). 
•  Some simple principles of management were applied, which promoted the dissemination of 
information, and the participation of the people in the elections by the general assembly of an 
administrative body (management board), the control board and a local manager (from the area). 
•  There was an internalisation of the practice of co-operative democracy with the support of the 
central bureau of popular banks (promotion) and the union of popular banks. 
•  There also was a focused system  of coaching and control by regional representatives and 
decentralised development units as well as strict management (monthly and quarterly financial 
statements to be submitted to the central bank). 
1.4 Informal finance in rural areas 
In the absence of organised credit systems, rural people resort to two main types of 
other systems: 
•  Informal interpersonal credit systems through family and friends (low or no 
interest rates, based on kinship or neighbourhood solidarity and reciprocity), or 
through moneylenders or loan brokers (quick, short-term credit, high interest 
rates, up to 300% per annum), credit merchants and traders (goods supplied on a 
credit basis), pawnbrokers (material collateral basis) or landlords (credit for 
production inputs to a sharecropper). 
•  Various systems of rotating savings and credit associations (ROSCAs), savings 
groups, “tontines”. Such systems have been widely developed all over the 
continent with many variations. 
ROSCAs (known as “tontines” in western Africa, “stokvels” in South Africa) are 
especially popular among women. Various forms and levels of contribution exist 
(from US$ 0.2 per week, up to more than US$ 1000 per month, as seen among 
Bamileke merchants in Cameroon). The system relies on reciprocity: each member 
contributes on a weekly or monthly basis, at a fixed date, and each member receives 
alternately (fixed, or after a toss or a draw) all the contributions. Other systems consist of a money keeper collecting and giving back money on an individual basis, 
according to his needs. 
Despite a certain willingness to incorporate ROSCAs into the COOPECs, it seems 
preferable to let both structures function separately. According to the farmers, they 
provide different services and are subject to different operational rules. 
Savings groups are also very popular in developing areas. A group will be formed 
with a common objective (be it ultimately for individual or communal purposes). 
Funds are deposited with a money keeper or directly in a bank. Communal purposes 
include building a clinic, a school, water services, and so on. Some groups may even 
invest collectively in a business run by the group or by an appointed manager. 
Savings groups also provide the mutual motivation to save, something which may be 
difficult to do as an individual. 
Burial societies are very popular in rural South Africa (Coetzee, 1993). In certain 
communities, almost every household belongs to a burial society, which uses the 
money to cover burial costs of members who die. 
1.5 Example of the Grameen Bank (in Bangladesh) and its application to 
Africa 
The Grameen Bank experience in Bangladesh is well known. Its basic idea is to 
support rural populations, especially the poorest of the poor with an emphasis on 
credit rather than on savings. 
The Grameen Bank system has managed to develop 
•  in a context of precarious livings conditions (low employment, rural small-scale 
trading and craftwork activities, meagre revenues, great dependence vis-à-vis 
local usurers, rural exodus, urban unemployment and poverty, marginalisation of 
women and regular natural calamities). 
•  through the initiative of a scientist working on action research based on local 
solidarity and organisation; the first objective was to create self-employment. 
Subsequently it developed into a banking institution for the poor, especially 
women (85% of the members); the system relies on the so-called “strength of the 
poor”: solidarity, a vivid experience of the value of money, tenacity and the 
struggle for survival. 
•  with an approach which clearly departs from classical banking systems: no forms 
are filled in, no collateral requested, there are no tills or tellers but a staff of well-
trained agents work with the villages. 
•  based on a set-up of joint and several guarantee groups made up of five people 
who are socially and economically homogenous, who know and trust one and 
other and generally with men and women in separate groups. 
•  based on the credit activity at the outset and later on savings; the credit includes 
•  individual productive activities (one year loan, at 16%) redeemed in 52 




•  collective productive activities (under the same conditions); the credit 
ceiling is multiplied by the number of members (but granted only to 
previous beneficiaries who have paid back their loans). 
•  housing loans, for 12 to 18 years, granted only to good members. 
•  emergency aid, in the case of disaster (floods) payable according to the 
same conditions as the productive activities. •  a rescue fund (in the case of death, disability, unexpected problems), 
fed by a contribution of 25% of interest paid on credits. 
 
Loans are first granted to two members, then to two more and finally to the fifth 
member (if the first ones have been paying back). The whole group examines the 
demands for loans and decisions are made collectively. 
The economic impact of the Grameen Bank system is first measured by the magnitude 
of the credit activity (year-1995 figures): 
•  There are about 1 million beneficiaries (of which about 85% are women) from 
about 20000 villages. 
•  There is about US$ 170 million in credit. 
•  About US$ 17 million has been transferred to the rescue fund. 
•  There is a high loan recovery rate (over 98%). 
•  The Grameen bank system employs 6000 persons. 
At the beneficiaries’ level, the impact is measured through 
•  the accumulation of productive capital by the households, 
•  increased income (20 to 50%), 
•  job creation 
•  a decline in usurious rates and an increase in agricultural salaries owing to 
pressure for higher wages. 
This success story should not lead to this system being merely copied in Africa. One 
of the reasons for its success is that the Grameen Bank system has developed its own 
type of organisation adapted to the very conditions of the country after a relatively 
long phase of experimentation. Beneficiaries form heterogeneous socio-economic 
groups, who experience rapid individual turnover rates (small-scale entrepreneurs) 
and pursue diverse activities, thus generating different financial needs. Unlike 
farmers, who are all bound to the same planting schedule in a given area, Grameen 
Bank group members do not have credit needs simultaneously, and do not all pay 
back at the same time. Thus risk is diversified across different sectors.  
Recent experiments in Burkina-Faso and Guinea have drawn their inspiration from 
this example. In Guinea, the following principles have been applied: 
•  A joint and several guarantee group is formed with five members: these members 
choose one another freely; they are from the same village and share a common 
socio-economic situation; women and men form separate groups; traditional 
authorities (village wisemen) have a controlling and supervisory function in these 
groups. 
•  Credit is based on the needs expressed and takes account of the multiple nature of 
rural activities (agricultural inputs, labour, small-scale businesses, etc.); it gives 
priority to economic criteria (e.g. profitability of the activities supported by the 
credit); each member presents and justifies his/her credit application before the 
group and the credit agents. 
•  It is based on rotating credit: two members are served, then two others and then 
the fifth member (who is the head of the group). 
•  There is regular and close monitoring of the beneficiaries both at their homes and 
workplaces; 
•  Management procedures are simplified and flexible (the credit ceiling may be 
increased if the previous loan was reimbursed without problems; medium-term 
collective credit may be granted after a successful short-term experience); 
monitoring-evaluation and dialogue with the beneficiaries determine adaptations. •  An interest rate higher than the inflation rate is fixed to preserve the value of both 
the invested capital and the credit. 
•  A 100% loan recovery rate is required, with strict adherence to due payment dates, 
otherwise no further credit will be granted. 
 
Note that many Grammen Bank replications in Africa failed or incurred internal 
problems that led to high drop out rates. Graham and Von Pishke (1995) argued that 
the context is so different that it is unsurprising that the Grameen replication in Africa 
was not that successful. They refer to the more dispersed profile of African rural 
areas, the practice of migrant labour systems and more. A few examples do exist that 
are successful (for example the Small Enterprise Foundation in South Africa), but in 
general Grameen replications have met with extensive problems in Africa. 
1.6 Besides COOPECs and ROSCAs, what else? 
COOPECs, ROSCAs and informal credit systems are not the sole instruments for 
credit and savings in rural areas. Other systems do exist as briefly described below. 
1.6.1 Seed stocks as savings and credit systems at community levels 
For the past 30 years in Madagascar, Niger and Mali, a successful collective savings 
system has existed through seed storehouses. The norm for an individual loan is the 
reimbursement of two bags of seed harvested for each bag of seed borrowed during 
the sowing period. However, farmers have collectively adopted a 50% interest rate 
(1,5 bags paid back for 1 borrowed). Even if a small part of this interest is used for 
storage fees (seed treatment, possible loss), the initial stock is tripled in three years. 
 
Given an initial stock of 100, and annual storage fees of 10, the following progression occurs: 
First year: Seeds borrowed = 100; Seeds repaid = 150; Available final stock = 140 
Second year: Seeds borrowed = 140; Seeds repaid = 210; Available final stock = 200 
Third year: Seeds borrowed = 200; Seeds repaid = 300; Available final stock = 290. 
 
In practice, the community uses part of the stock for sowing. The rest can be sold 
inside or outside the community and the money is then invested for community 
purposes. This operation reduces the costs for borrowers and makes it difficult for 
money to be stolen (money is handled and stock usually located right in the middle of 
the village). This allows for collective investments and enhances the quality of the 
seeds (which are stored and treated under good conditions, with the possibility of 
stored seeds being renewed with improved seeds). 
1.6.2 Savings and credit from grain banks 
There is a wide variety of grain banks with diverse purposes (e.g. food security at 
community level), and with as many successes as failures. A grain bank is a 
community or inter-community organisation that manages a stock in kind. This stock 
may be pooled through purchases among members, purchases from other areas with 
excess production or from external inputs. The stock is either resold or lent to 
members during harsh periods (e.g. dry season, low-yielding years). It can also be 
kept in total or in part to form a safeguard. 
In all cases, an important factor of success is the adoption of a differentiated policy, 
which depends on the results of the growing season (surplus or deficit). To generate revenue, it is essential to buy the products at the beginning of the harvesting period so 
that the bank may benefit from the difference between the price at that time and the 
increased prices during the “hungry gap” before the next harvest. Then loans in the 
form of bags of grain can be considered throughout the year, with the option of having 
different interest rates depending on whether it is for a member or a non-member. 
1.6.3 Initial donations of capital to farmers’ organisation 
In situations where it is impossible to initiate savings or where loan repayments are 
uncertain, the solution may be an initial donation (initial capital), in the hope that this 
will reproduce itself in the long term. 
 
An example in the Gao area (Mali) after the harsh 1973 drought that dramatically affected fishermen’s 
activities: 
A consortium of  NGOs released capital in successive packages to fishermen’s co-operatives in order 
for them to re-establish their means of production (pirogues and nets). All modes of credit as well as 
borrowers' choices (nature of credit, period of repayment) were carefully discussed and decided on in a 
general assembly. The first package was earmarked for about 20% of the fishermen. The second 
package was granted only after the first group had paid back 100% of their loan. There was therefore 
social pressure from the group of future borrowers, which in turn resulted in a high loan recovery rate. 
When all the fishermen interested had been served, the money from the repayments was used in 
different ways depending on the co-operative. (E.g. to set up workshops for the manufacture of 
pirogues; to buy stocks of grains; to set up a shop for the commercialisation of salt fish; to buy a 
motorised pirogue for faster transport of fresh fish to the nearest towns; etc.). 
 
The World Bank has financed small-scale rural projects (e.g. FONADEC in Senegal) 
through initial donations (e.g. a motor pump for a small-scale irrigation scheme). In 
this case a bank account is opened and managed by the farmers. Farmers’ payments 
are calculated taking account of the equipment’s maintenance and renewal. The basic 
assumption, based on past experiences especially in Senegal, is that farmers are not 
very motivated to pay back any parastatal organisation or development project. 
Conversely, they are eager to contribute to their own accounts, especially when it 
comes to protecting their own activities and making them sustainable in the long run. 
When inter-community solidarity exists, an alternative solution may be a rotating 
system whereby the repayment of the first investment realised in the community 
serves to finance a new investment in a neighbouring community. This principle has 
been adopted with the mills in Yatenga (Burkina Faso). 
In Niger, agricultural credit to co-operatives has been initiated by USAID (USA co-
operation and aid agency) and other sponsors. Their approach combines credit, and 
training and support to farmers’ organisations through low initial capital. Other 
organisations combine subsidies on credit for initial investments with compulsory 
savings. These approaches have proved relevant and efficient in certain situations. 
1.6.4 Development funds 
The objective of such funds is to promote savings at the village level and to make use 
of the savings in productive community investments. The community members 
themselves decide on the modalities of the loans. Another objective is to get the 
community acquainted with local financial systems and then to promote further self-
managed systems for credit, savings and investment. 
 One village development fund is located in Segou (Mali) and  supported by IFAD (International agency 
for food and agriculture development). Each village was requested to pool and to manage a fund to be 
used for the community's needs and to serve as a guarantee of the debt’s recovery. 
 
Village people can use the credit for diverse activities, for example, for cash crop 
fertilisation, improvement of small stock herds, domestic industries, rural small-scale 
industries such as forges, handicraft activities, woodworks, and the like. The high 
percentage of loan recovery (104% in Segou, Mali, which means a total loan 
repayment plus additional contributions) shows the extent to which the villagers feel 
responsible for the village funds. 
In many cases, small shops have been established to generate additional funds. IFAD's 
long-term objective is to make these shops into real development centres at the 
community level, where farmers can obtain production inputs, credit and technical 
advice. 
 
These are only a few examples showing that, over and above the official structures for 
agricultural credit, there are many modalities for financing rural development; 
savings; credit; subsidies; contributions in cash, kind or labour; investment; ROSCAs 
and the various combinations of all these modalities. Secondly, experience shows that 
in each situation the farmers and rural people should lead the discussions and make 
the decisions themselves. It is also clear that not one single institutional format is the 
solution to rural finance problems. No, each situation calls for a different solution and 
therefore practitioners should always be lead by the local people, their systems and 
their vies and perceptions when designing intervention methods. 
2. Some issues for debate 
Part one has clearly shown that there has been more failure than success in the field of 
rural credit. There are of course some success stories but they are either linked to very 
specific situations (cotton) or they are too recent to allow conclusive lessons to be 
drawn. Many points remain controversial, and different practices with different 
philosophies can still be observed. The views expressed here are not unanimously 
shared. 
2.1 Agricultural credit or rural credit? 
Up to now, official programmes which are linked to different operations undertaken 
by various governments have been preoccupied with agricultural credit in its 
narrowest meaning, that is with supporting access to inputs, seeds, agricultural 
equipment, and so on. When a free choice is given to the farmers, it becomes obvious 
very quickly that their credit priorities concern a wider range of activities: small stock 
production; fattening and feed-lotting of pigs, sheep, goats; domestic food processing; 
local trading; handicraft; storage; labour hiring; spare part supply; and the like. 
If one wants to respond to the farmers’ needs, thereby increasing the diversification of 
activities by rural people, financial support should undoubtedly not be limited to 
agricultural credit. Free choice and direct involvement by the farmers helps to prevent 
misappropriation, heavy procedures, low recovery rates, and mistrust of credit 
monitoring. 
Ensuring the availability of efficient rural finance services (including saving) rather 
than extending credit to finance exclusively agricultural production is a preferable approach when rural development is pursued. There is nothing “sacred” in income 
generated from agriculture compared with income generated from any other rural 
activity. Furthermore, given the high co-variant risk associated with agriculture, often 
other non-agriculture activities would mitigate such risk. Rural Finance Intermediaries 
have often obtained a more balanced and less risky arrears “contaminated” loan 
portfolio when launching credit in an indiscriminate manner to all segments of the 
rural economy, thereby considering the creditworthiness of the borrower and the 
merits of the investments financed. 
2.2 "Hot money" vs. "cold money"? Is the mixture possible? 
“Hot money” is money which comes from the farmers who control it and which 
deserves both attention and social control. The rural people look negatively upon and 
even apply social pressure or ban people who fail to pay back a fellow farmer or the 
local farmers’ co-operative. 
“Cold money” comes from the government and external sponsors. “Cold money” is 
often stolen, misappropriated, or not paid back. The communities do not necessarily 
see this in a negative light. 
The social value granted to both types is obviously different, as are the ways to 
manage them. These distinctions explain the significant differences of loan recovery 
rates between the COOPECs or ROSCAs and the official credit institutions. 
The mere idea of farmers putting their savings back into the rural areas may result in 
improvements. However, this is not sufficient to respond to all the needs, especially 
those of the most disadvantaged with low savings potential (resource-poor farmers, 
women and youngsters). Financial input from outside is almost always necessary. 
This input can have an initiating and multiplier effect on savings. The most important 
thing is that this input should not be perceived as easy or cold money. The farmers’ 
involvement in the setting up of the system (selection of the borrowers, modalities of 
repayment, types of guarantees, etc.) is critical to the sustainability of the system 
(through high loan recovery rate). 2.3 Different financial technologies 
In essence the experience under the new approach can be classified into projects or 
programmes that use savings first or credit first approaches and those that provide 
services to individuals or to groups (or to both). The real test for efficient strategies is 
whether a correct assessment of prevailing circumstances in the project area leads to the 
application of the appropriate financial technology. In this section short overviews will 
be provided on the savings first, credit first and group approaches. An understanding of 
these approaches is essential when applying policies differentiated according to the 
circumstances in specific settings. 
2.3.1 Savings first approach 
The savings first strategy indicates that a financial intermediary provides savings 
facilities before engaging in loan activities. The first observation is that any 
intermediary using this strategy grows much more slowly than one using a credit first 
strategy (Graham & Von Pischke, 1995). Several variants of the savings and credit 
co-operative (or group based) venture serve as examples of institutions following this 
approach, including savings and credit associations, credit unions, co-operative banks, 
and in a much more informal version, savings clubs and burial societies (Coetzee, 
1988). 
Graham and Von Pischke (1995) argue that the savings first strategy is time 
consuming in that quite some time is spent in initiating these activities. However, 
village level activities benefit from a wealth of information on members and potential 
members. Earlier we also argued that poor rural people have several incentives to save 
and that savings propensities in rural areas are normally relatively high (see the 
discussion in section 5.4). Group based savings activities may, therefore, take longer 
to build volume when starting at the village level, but the institutional base is 
normally strong and sustainable. 
Graham and Von Pischke (1995) argue that savings are typically mobilised from 6 
months to a year before loans are made. In some South African village bank examples 
it takes up to three years before loan services are considered (Coetzee, 1997; 
Schoeman, 1996). The village banks in South Africa deposit members' contributions 
and savings with commercial banks during the portfolio building period (Coetzee, 
1997). 
In normal institutional evolution village level savings based institutions generate 
enough volume to start with loan activities. As soon as a number of these institutions 
start in the same geographic area one would also expect a second tier institution that 
intermediates between the first tier or primary institutions. This is the path that was 
followed by the German co-operative banking movement (Howell, 1980) and the 
Canadian co-operative banks (Von Pischke, 1991).  
The problems inherent in credit first strategies (see next section) centre on issues of 
moral hazard and principal agent problems. These problems are very uncommon in 
savings first strategies, though they do occur. Hard earned money deposited in savings 
accounts have often vanished among the management or staff of financial institutions. 
These problems are not common in member managed and operated village based 
settings. 
Some other disadvantages are present in savings first strategies (Schmidt & Zeitinger, 
1995). Firstly, it can be costly and demanding to manage a large number of deposit 
accounts, especially the high turnover of accounts without fixed maturities for small 
savers. One way to decrease these costs is not to try and recover purely on the differential between return on deposits at commercial banks for the institution and 
what depositors earn (in the beginning phase), or the spread between interest income 
on loans and interest paid on deposits in later phases. Charging a fee for each 
transaction can generate income. In the village banks in South Africa this is common 
practice (Coetzee, 1997). Secondly, depositors are at great risk in institutions that are 
not capable of managing their funds carefully. Emphasis should be on starting small 
and being member driven. Graham and Von Pischke (1995) argue that where these 
institutions increase in size to numerous members, each with a small account, it is not 
in the interest of any one small group of savers to incur the transaction costs of 
organising themselves to monitor the management of the institution. This problem has 
manifested itself from time to time in credit unions in which the one-person-one-vote 
ownership principle, regardless of the ownership of shares or deposits held, weakens 
the vigilance of the widespread ownership base (Chaves, 1994). In short, there are 
trade-offs between the virtues and the costs and limitations of the savings first path to 
institutional development. However, experience indicates that if these institutions 
operate with high member involvement and the ability to reach second and even third 
tier organisation, they can become formidable financial institutions. One example is 
the German co-operative banking system, which grew over a period of 100 years to 
2600 co-operative banks which have 19500 outlets and formidable assets and are 
organised at the second and third tier level (DGRV, 1996). 
As a general rule, a savings first approach is preferable to other approaches in order to 
encourage self-reliance and to lead people to become more independent (Gentil, 
1993). This should not be a dogmatic rule, however. In certain circumstances (for 
example a prevailing climate of distrust where there were earlier failures in the 
financial system and people lost savings) and for certain social categories and spatial 
settings (the real destitute and poor, especially women in this category) there is every 
justification for starting with credit or providing both credit and savings services. The 
lesson is that dogmatic rules lead to the application of inappropriate models in certain 
settings. 
2.3.2 Credit first approach 
Credit-first strategies are common in NGO and specialised credit institutions. These 
programmes are mostly funded by outside donors and governments. Credit-first 
programmes expand much more rapidly than savings-first as they avoid the time-
consuming task of first mobilising local savings (lending is funded externally) and 
frequently employ group loans as part of their lending technology, thus multiplying 
the clientele (Graham & Von Pischke, 1995). 
In contrast to savings first strategies credit first strategies are riddled with moral 
hazard problems. These institutions are mostly financed and operated by external 
agents without the benefit of adequate local information flows. They cannot use the 
local social structure to monitor clients. Historically (as was argued in chapter three) 
major default situations arose in these institutions due to the cold money/warm money 
syndrome
1 (Gentil, 1993). 
Programmes addressed moral hazard by designing contracts that reduce opportunistic 
or irresponsible borrower behaviour (Graham & Von Pischke, 1995). This has been 
                                                   
1 “Warm money comes from the farmers themselves, is controlled by them and seen by  them as 
deserving careful husbandry…cold money is money from the state or foreign financiers, which can 
therefore be used for unauthorised purposes or need not be repaid.  Defaulting on cold money loans is 
considered a cunning thing to do and is not frowned upon by other farmers” (Gentil, 1993). done typically in three ways: using local agents, employing local people as loan 
officers and using a group based strategy. In the case of local agents and employing 
local people as loan officers the institution would want to ensure that their 
remuneration and incentive packages are structured in a way that will decrease moral 
hazard amongst the staff (or agents). 
Very few success stories in terms of sustainable institutions with acceptable outreach 
and development impact can be sited where the credit-first strategy has been used. A 
number of researchers stated the following criteria for success concerning the 
financial technologies required to secure sustainability in credit-first NGO 
programmes serving micro and small enterprises (Christen et al; Schmidt & Zeitinger, 
quoted by Graham & Von Pischke, 1995
2): Interest rates must be high enough to 
cover a realistic cost of funds, all administrative expenses, loan losses and a decent 
return on capital. Furthermore, loan recovery must be well over 90 per cent. Loan 
officers should plan on serving approximately 200 to 250 accounts each in a densely 
populated urban or peri-urban environment, to keep total administration costs down to 
15 to 20 per cent of the portfolio by the time the programme achieves scale economies 
in five to seven years. To achieve these goals loan administration must be 
decentralised with an incentive compatible internal organisation and control structure, 
using frequent audits and attractive performance based remuneration for managers 
and loan officers. Character lending is feasible, but loan maturities and repayment 
schedules must be consistent with the customer's cash flow. Lending should start with 
smaller, short-term loans to allow customers to prove their creditworthiness before 
obtaining larger loans. A limited range of simple, standardised loan services should be 
offered in the beginning. An information management system for timely loan tracking 
is essential. This implies computerisation. Finally savings services have to be 
developed to provide leverage for funds and reduce moral hazard once the lending 
activities achieve viability.  
2.3.3 Group approach 
Group approaches are based on informal group based financial institutions and have 
been popularised by the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh (Yunus, 1992). Groups are 
essentially utilised to decrease information problems and decrease transaction costs of 
rural financial intermediation (Huppi & Feder, 1990). Decreasing information 
problems also decreases the incidence of moral hazard. It follows that the group 
approach was favoured in credit-first strategies. Group approaches are also applied as 
a collateral substitute, once again based on the flow and availability of information in 
the group.  
There is wide difference of opinion on the relevance of group approaches versus 
individual approaches. In developing countries these two kinds of lending 
arrangements have a mixed record. This is especially true in Africa. Graham and Von 
Pischke (1995) summarise the following lessons in this regard: 
 
•  Group lending in the Grameen Bank was built on a strong investment in group 
formation and substantial investment in recruiting committed and well-trained 
staff before lending began. None of these human capital investments have been 
                                                   
2 The rest of this paragraph draws on a summary of criteria compiled by Graham and Von Pischke, 
1995. 
 strong in African programmes. One of the more important obstacles in the African 
programmes is the very high cost of scarce trained personnel compared to 
Bangladesh where an ample supply of low cost university graduates has been 
available for the Grameen programme from the beginning.  
•  Migration is more prevalent in rural Africa, creating more unstable groups, 
particularly those with male members.  
•  Weekly or fortnightly repayment schedules are established to generate frequent 
meetings for the interaction and discipline required to maintain group cohesion 
and regular repayments. This does not always fit into the cash flow patterns of 
agriculture. Hence groups made up of farmers in the African programme 
encounter difficulties. The risk of cash flow interruption is too high as farm groups 
suffer from covariant risk and the transaction costs of managing a spatially more 
dispersed clientele are also high. Group lending programmes built on micro-
enterprise activity in towns have generally been more successful. 
•  Joint solidarity has its limits. Once members in a group have made up for the 
shortfall of their delinquent members on two or three occasions the group 
collapses on the next default. Intra-group solidarity has been compromised 
frequently by free riding behaviour. Given the high prestige elderly women enjoy 
in African villages, it is next to impossible for younger women in the group to 
deny them group membership or exercise peer pressure or threaten group sanction, 
against these economically inactive elderly members who delay or refuse to repay 
their debts. It only takes two or three episodes of this free riding behaviour to 
destroy the group. 
•  A common misconception of Grameen replications in Africa lies in the confusion 
with joint liability that is incorrectly associated with the Bank’s institutional 
design. The Grameen Bank uses group solidarity principles to select, shape and 
train groups of five clients; however, it merely uses the group as a vehicle to make 
individual loans. Moreover, in the event of individual borrower delinquency, 
contrary to conventional wisdom, group liability is not triggered to draw the other 
members into covering this shortfall. Instead, a contingency fund, built up through 
an extra charge on each loan, is used for this purpose. In many of the African 
programmes such as in Burkina Faso, however, the other members of the group 
are immediately expected to make up for the delinquent borrower’s payment. This 
leads to acrimonious relationships among members and their families. Instead of 
group solidarity, this leads to sporadic peer pressure with problematic results. 
•  The practice of holding other groups in a village (i.e., a sector) responsible for the 
failure of a delinquent group is followed in many programmes, expanding the 
group solidarity concept into a broader neighbourhood or village sector solidarity 
strategy. This has frequently proven counterproductive as groups who are current 
on their loans resist covering for delinquent groups with whom they may feel little 
solidarity. When this occurs programme directors cut off the credit flows to groups 
current in their payments to induce them to make up for delinquent groups. This 
only trigger wholesale delinquency, a testament to the law of unintended, but 
highly predictable consequences, from the perverse incentives built into this 
particular group lending institutional design. 
 
Huppi and Feder (1990; Slover, 1991) indicate that successful group lending schemes 
are difficult to replicate due to the area and group specific characteristics of each 
group. Graham and Von Pischke (1995) refer to the least documented and least known “black box” of group lending, that is the nature of the group dynamics within these 
programmes. How does one operationally define and empirically measure such 
important but slippery concepts as group homogeneity, group solidarity and, in the 
absence of group solidarity, peer pressure? Answers to these questions could 
contribute to better institutional design and the measurement of programme 
performance for group lending programmes.  
2.4 Entrepreneurial (productive) vs. consumption (unproductive) credit 
Often the tendency is to prioritise productive credit and to distrust unproductive credit 
(e.g. hunger-gap aid, social credit and credit that supports commercialisation). In fact 
this tendency is not often relevant, for several reasons: 
•  The boundaries between unproductive and productive credit are not clear and the 
farmers express both economic and non-economic needs (credit for production 
and credit for social needs.  
•  Most attempts at giving agricultural credit based on offers predetermined by 
development operators without accounting for the farmers’ choices and strategies 
have failed. 
•  The implementation of unproductive credit (for social needs or consumption) can 
be considered acceptable if it is known that the beneficiary will repay it with the 
revenue derived from profitable agricultural production. Such credit may actually 
stimulate agricultural production. 
•  If unproductive credit is discarded the farmers might resort to usury to face their 
social obligations. The farmers have to pay higher interest rates which makes 
them dependant (the whole harvest may have to be given as a guarantee to the 
lender or trader). 
•  Loans do not always support a sole investment by a farmer; they often cover two 
or three activities, thus allowing the farmers to minimise risk through 
diversification (animal husbandry, crop production, off-farm activities, etc.).  
2.5 Credit to the rich vs. credit to the poor 
Contrary to common belief, rich clients are not always the best payers and low loan 
recovery rates are found among civil servants, traders and local notables, as well as 
the poor people. 
Can one target only the poor (as in the Grameen Bank experience)? The social and 
economic structures in Africa differ from those in Bangladesh. Discrimination among 
potential rural borrowers is not acceptable. Moreover, the poverty criterion (or 
threshold) is not easy to determine when farmers have access to land and own 
animals. Discrimination would deprive many farmers who have no credit alternatives. 
It seems preferable to fix an upper limit for credit (loan ceiling) (e.g. between US$ 
100 and US$ 200). Such credit is not likely to interest big, potential rural borrowers. 
Categories of people that are often excluded from credit (especially women, resource-
poor farmers, small-scale entrepreneurs, etc.) would qualify for this type of loan. 
However, it must be also emphasized that fixing a ceiling often leads to distortions, 
but no ceiling on an interest rate makes it less enticing for the rich to push the poor 
aside.  2.7 Interest rates, the cost of credit, and the search for a financial 
equilibrium 
The majority of development operators favour low interest rates for the agricultural 
sector and higher rates for savings. This viewpoint has been reinforced by the 
regulations of some central banks. Unfortunately, such an approach seldom allows for 
the system to be sustainable, and it led to many failures which occur soon after 
external funding stops (subsidies). Sound management of credit and saving systems 
for smallholders remain costly, even when the procedures are simplified and when 
farmers contribute through unpaid labour. Transaction costs are numerous and high 
owing to the small but numerous operations being treated, the numerous trips, the 
risks, the time spent in negotiations, the discussions, the information, the training, and 
so on). 
Observations and past experiences show the following: 
•  The necessity of very low interest rates has never been confirmed during 
discussions with the farmers. When involved in setting up a credit system, farmers 
compare the offers with the usurers’ rates (100% to 300%) and consider as 
acceptable any interest rate lower than what they are used to. A recent study in 
South Africa indicated that the shadow price of small farmer credit is double what 
they are paying, thus indicating that they could afford and tolerate far higher 
interest rates than commonly assumed. 
•  Two credit systems may coexist, different but complementary, as illustrated in 
eastern Senegal where a cotton growers’ association benefited from 
•  a formal credit offer, initiated by the cotton processing company 
SODEFITEX (credit for input supply and animal traction), which was 
challenged by the farmers owing to ever- increasing input prices and 
interest rates for medium-term credit for animal traction being 
considered too high (-15%+); 
•  an informal credit offer initiated and organised by the growers’ 
association (financed by the cotton tax, pooled and collectively 
managed by the association) which supported social and consumption 
needs at the annual rate of 25%. 
In addition, most credit granted is seasonal credit (less than one year) which mobilises 
small nominal amounts for a limited time (usually from 6 to 8 months). Hence, 
payments are small, with few variations whatever the interest rate. The major concern 
of farmers is to access credit under conditions that leave them room for choice in its 
utilisation. 
IThe most important aspect here is to really understand the client farmers’ needs and 
design products that suit those needs, and answer to the requirements of the financial 
institution. These needs will not necessarily be only for farming and farming families 
have many more needs for financial services which are not met by the conventional 
formal financial institutions. This is why they quite often resort to a interacting with a 
multiple of financial institutions, ranging from informal to formal. 
 
 
Towards sustainable local financing structures 
The profitability of a local credit and savings structure is determined as follows: 
Gross bank profit = income - expenses Bank income = interests on the loans + interests on investments + commissions or fees charged to 
clients 
Bank expenses = clients’ remuneration 
Net profit = gross benefit – standing operation costs – variable costs (risks) 
The standing costs are very high owing to the high transaction costs they include (numerous operations 
with an average deposit/credit operation amount of US$ 40). The variable costs may remain low and 
constant as long as the loan recovery rates are high. 
From the above and from past experiences, the following factors should be considered: 
1. In terms of management costs:  
- Relying on benevolence, unpaid labour 
- Simplifying management to the extreme 
- Remunerating clients through savings rather than through quasi-free credit, and granting credit at 
acceptably high rates 
- Maximising profit from available cash and funds (through investments) 
- Limiting the role of external organisations with regard to cash management 
- Introducing cross-control procedures among the operators 
2. In terms of risks: 
- Maximising the solidarity of the community associations 
- Letting the farmers’ groups decide on credits 
- Avoiding granting credit to civil servants and local big traders 
- Training farmers in active management and risk evaluation 
To solve the tricky challenge of long-term equilibrium and sustainability, one  should have a banking 
spirit, and always bear in mind that every cost incurred, every risk taken will eventually impact on the 
beneficiaries who might then discard the system if they deem these charges to be unexpectedly 
burdensome. 
2.8 Centralisation vs. decentralisation 
Many problems facing credit systems are linked to excessive centralisation, that result 
in long procedures, expensive overheads, gaps between the decision level and the 
implementation level, gaps between the COOPECs and their local groups, 
decentralisation of decision making of both local agents and farmers. 
One must therefore get the grass-roots structures more involved, and have them take 
more responsibility for decisions on granting credit and recovery, and for personnel 
and financial equilibrium. Structures must be geographically and socially close to the 
beneficiaries (both savers and borrowers) who will in turn consider them as their own 
concerns. However, these grass-roots structures must also benefit from regional and 
national support, especially in the fields of training, control and monitoring, in 
representation vis-à-vis the authorities and in negotiations with the official banking 
structures. 
Part of the support costs must be paid by the base structures, while external financial 
support (e.g. on training) may temporarily be important. In any case, these services 
should be implemented by lean structures (e.g. a tenth of staff members at national 
level) and must truly serve the grass-roots structures, and not become a steering and 
burdensome hierarchy. 3. Methodological orientations 
The diversity of experience and debates shows that there is no universal formula 
relevant for all situations or one model that takes priority. However, there are some 
constant elements. 
3.1 Several basic principles about rural finance 
•  Rural credit must respond to the real needs expressed by the farmers (the credit 
offer must coincide with the demand), and should match the realities and 
constraints of the rural environment and of the potential beneficiaries. 
•  Credit should be linked to local savings; experience has demonstrated that credit is 
better recovered when it mobilises the beneficiaries’ savings. 
•  Credit does have a cost. This is reflected in the interest rate which must include 
the real costs (e.g. cost of the resource, management costs, cost of the risks 
incurred), and which is necessary for the system to be reproducible, thus 
sustainable in the long run. 
•  Specific agents must carry out credit monitoring and management. They must be 
trained and be able to make a proper diagnosis. Such a diagnosis should rely on 
observations and regular dialogues with the beneficiaries and result in procedures 
being adapted if necessary. 
•  The structure in charge of credit operations must be autonomous from other 
development operators (agricultural extension, input supply, etc.). It must also be 
psychologically and physically close to the beneficiaries (without intermediaries). 
It must seek the active participation of the people concerned. 
•  The state and its administration should support the initiation of actions and 
contribute to their evaluation. But it should not interfere with the operations perse, 
since the farmers’ trust in the system is critical and is more easily gained if the 
rural people do not feel that the government is intervening. 
3.2 Elements of an approach 
3.2.1 Starting from a situation diagnosis 
Special attention must be paid to defining and ranking the financial needs of the 
farmers. This process should consider the local diversity (types of farmers) and 
include any other diagnosis related to other relevant functions. Discussion can lead to 
a critical analysis of past credit experiences by the farmers and of the current credit 
conditions (official or informal, interest rates, constraints in getting loans granted, 
recovery systems, guarantees, etc.). One should also try to analyse past and current 
ROSCAs’ experiences. 
3.2.2 Defining a strategy 
This stage follows the diagnosis. Several cases may be considered: 
•  There is no existing financial system or institution in place. In such a case, a 
model should be progressively designed through experimentation and dialogue 
with farmers. 
•  There is a system or a rural finance institution in place (e.g. national agricultural 
bank, other bank). In such a case, two strategies may be envisaged depending on 
the situation: -  Setting up a complementary system of rural mutual savings and credit 
close to the farmers, which takes into account the needs which have 
not been satisfied (e.g. adapted Grameen Bank system) 
-  Buying out the rural credit institution with or without mutualisation 
(such situations currently occur in Africa and Latin America) by 
farmers’ organisations or by a decentralised savings and credit system; 
this supposes that the buyer has the necessary financial means or that 
he/she receives external support (e.g. a sponsor may hold the social 
shares, which will be progressively repaid) 
The objective is to adapt the rural finance institution to the needs of the farmers. One 
must however keep in mind that it is often difficult to change the logic of action. 
Actually, such experiences have not proved successful. Even when farmers’ 
associations become shareholders (e.g. FONGS in Senegal being represented at the 
National Bank for Agricultural Credit), such a strategy has been risky and uncertain 
since it is not easy to induce the changes that are expected by the farmers. 
3.2.3 Setting up sound systems 
Difficulties arise when a completely new system has to be developed, when a system 
is new in the area but exists somewhere else, or when a system must be altered or 
adaptations have to be made. Points for review and decisions are not that numerous. 
One of the most acute problems is that of guarantees (collateral). The following 
examples present a rehabilitation process in a co-operative for savings and credit in 
Benin and the setting up process of a new system inspired by the Grameen Bank in 
Guinea-Conakry. 
Close attention must be paid to the procedures, the forms, the accounting system, and 
so on, in order to achieve simplicity and transparency in the system and to ensure the 
involvement of the local people. Finally, one should avoid reproducing the burden of 
heavy national structures while setting up vertical structures. 
 
In Benin: an experimental credit programme in the regional and local agricultural credit 
institutions (CLCAM and CRCAM) 
Financing credit: 
At the farmer level, it has been clearly stated from the outset that money for credit should come directly 
from the farmers’ savings and not from external sources. This creates complications when arranging the 
conditions for credit granting, the modalities for recovery and the nature of the guarantees. 
A proposal to use external funds (same amount as the loan in demand) has been made. This external 
financing actually correspond to a de-freezing of a part of the debts of the regional banks owed to the 
national bank (Borgou, Atlantique and Zou regions) and to the reconstitution of the equity capital (Mono 
and Zou regions). 
As far as cash management is concerned, there is a need to grant the first loans in March (for the 
planting season). These can be covered either by new savings in the Borgou region or by recovering 
previous loans in the Zou region. 
It is therefore necessary that external funds are made available to the different regions i n a timely 
manner. 
Modalities of credit: 
•  The loans granted at the local level are planting season loans (less than 1 year). However, in the 
Borgou area, the local board can be consulted by the regional branch about loans for animal 
traction and equipment. •  For the first year, loans are used for agriculture (labour, seeds and inputs), livestock (fattening 
piglets, poultry and kids), and the women's activities (small-scale trade, products processing, etc.). 
•  Interest rates are slightly below those usually practised in rural areas (reimbursement of two bags 
for one borrowed, 10% monthly interest rate, etc.). They must however cover the different charges 
of the local financial system (manager’s salary, running expenses, savings recovery, etc.). Interest 
rates have been set at 15% yearly for the Borgou area, and at 2% monthly for other regions. These 
rates cover the interest rate per se, as well as a contribution to the guarantee funds and diverse 
fees for setting up and monitoring the file. 
•  Loans are granted exclusively to members, including individuals and co-operative structures. 
•  The different management levels have established a number of conditions for granting credit. 
Although these conditions differ according to the variety of structures at the local level (this 
pinpoints the importance of local boards), they generally have the following characteristics: 
•  The application must be accepted by the board. 
•  The beneficiary must be a member of the co-operative, with no outstanding debts. 
•  The beneficiary must have saved a minimum of 10% of the value of the loan in demand (usually 
about US$ 15); savings are frozen until the credit is totally repaid. 
•  A credit ceiling is set up and strictly respected (generally between US$ 150 and US$ 600). 
•  The beneficiary must produce sufficient guarantees, moral guarantees (seriousness, honesty, hard-
working behaviour, etc.) as well as physical or financial collateral (guarantee by a cotton growers’ 
association, personal guarantee of fellow members of the co-operative, turn of ROSCA, agricultural 
products, house rent, vehicle, etc.). 
•  The schedule and modalities for loan granting, monitoring and recovery have been established for 
each local structure (e.g. in cotton areas, direct levying is carried out by local managers when the 
cotton company CARDER pays the cotton growers’ association). The manager and the board play 
an active role in each of these different areas. In case of outstanding payments, the board should 
be involved (applying moral pressure and implementing the guarantees stated i n the contract). 
Resorting to police or judiciary authorities must remain absolutely exceptional. 
Implementation: 
Procedures, formalities and paper work must be simplified as much as possible. Information about the 
conditions of granting credit must be distributed as widely as possible (i.e. general meetings). Public 
notices about these conditions must be displayed at the structure’s offices and should include a version 
in the local language. Members’ demands should be collected and submitted by the manager to the 
board (or to its credit committee). 
Monitoring and evaluation: 
The sound operation of the programmes is supervised by staff members at regional level, with the part-
time support of a consultant. Regular reports (in June and March) should be written, summarising and 
then evaluating the results. 
 
In Guinea-Conakry: an experience inspired by the Grameen Bank principles 
Objectives, elements of procedure  Planned  Achieved 
Nature of the credit  Profitable, diversified, agricultural / non- 
agricultural loans 
Yes 
Beneficiaries  Resource-poor farmers, men and 
women, crop and livestock farmers, 
craftspersons, anyone who wishes to 
develop current or new activities  
Small and medium-scale 
farmers formed the majority of 
those interested. Commercial 
farmers, civil servants and big 
traders were not interested 
owing to the low ceiling. 
Ceiling  US$ 35 to 45 (depending on the local 
structures) 
US$ 55 for all situations 
Duration  Less than one year at the beginning  Yes (12 months) Interest rate  3% per month on the remaining debit 
balance (the overall interest rate 
representing about 20% of the loan) 
Yes (+ 5% for file 
management) 
Repayment modalities  10 monthly payments, an 11
th one for 
interest, a 12
th one for guarantees 
(death, accident) 
12 equal monthly payments, 
including capital, interest and 
guarantees (called a solidarity 
fund, representing 20% of the 
interest) 
Guarantee  Self co-opted groups of 5 to 10, with 
rotating presidency 
Local chiefs check the groups’ quality 
informally 
 
The guarantee itself is the social 
pressure amongst group members in 
the event of outstanding monthly 
payments  
5 members in all groups. 
 
Yes, with complementary 
control by development 
operators 
Yes, there are 2 first 
beneficiaries, then 2 others 
after 2 months, and finally the 
president 
Partnership share  Low amount, provided when submitting 
the application or at loan granting 
US$ 0.5, levied from the loan 
granted 
Monitoring and evaluation  Loans are distributed and recovered on 





Regular and frequent visits to the 
groups to check the loans’ utilisation, 
and to take stock of activities and 
results 
Yearly assessment of loan impact and 
of the level of satisfaction 
Loans were distributed for the 
first time in July 1989. Further 
distribution and repayments 
are to take place at markets or 
at certain convenient locations 
chosen by farmers. 
Visits once to twice a month (at 
market places, farms, plots) 
 
Yet to be organised 
Training programme  Explanations and instructions provided 
on the conditions for credit 
Distribution of documents in written 
Poular, in Arabic, in French 
Yes, generally in 2-3 controlled 
training sessions 
 
3.2.4 Restructuring of specialised credit institutions 
The latest approach on a possible role for specialised credit institutions can be 
illustrated with the following discussion drawn from the work of Graham (1995)
3. 
Attempts to restructure credit institutions must recognise the high social costs and rent 
seeking behaviour of many of these institutions - qualities that characterised the 
performance that left many of them insolvent in the 1980s. In many African countries, 
especially in West Africa most development banks have been closed, or are in the 
process of closing. 
Any restructuring plans should recognise that institutions that specialise in farm 
finance are frequently candidates for failure since they do not diversify risk in their 
portfolios (thus high incidence of covariant risk). Hence any reform of agricultural 
development banks must accept the fact that they should increasingly diversify. In 
some countries they are the only banks operating in rural areas, giving them a 
potential franchise value. When their current financial state does not make them 
sufficiently attractive to investors for immediate privatisation, consideration should be 
given to improving their condition to the point where they can be sold to private 
buyers. If this is not possible, a second best alternative may be to restructure radically 
                                                   
3 The rest of this section is drawn from the work of Graham (1995). Graham and Von Pischke (1995) 
were of the first researchers to question these extremes in approaches to rural financial markets.  their internal organisation and external mission to survive as sustainable institutions 
supplying realistically priced financial services earning decent rates of return.  
Much of what follows distils the experience gained in reformed state banks in South 
East Asia (Yaron et al, 1996; Yaron, 1992) and in a recent South African study 
(Strauss Commission, 1996; Coetzee, 1997). “Banks fail because of bad policies, poor 
banking practices and weak institutional frameworks” (Sheng, 1996). This statement 
was made regarding commercial banks in developing countries. If we add to these 
reasons all the additional ailments of state agricultural banks, it is clear that 
restructuring becomes a formidable task. The question is how to reorganise these 
institutions so that they do not fall prey to the same vices that largely destroyed their 
usefulness as financial institutions in the past. Based on the experience restructuring 
and transformation should attend to the following general areas (Coetzee, 1997; 
Strauss Commission, 1996; Graham, 1995;): 
A. Role of government, clarity of role and functions, and political commitment 
Experience shows that government is rarely successful when it tries to engage directly 
in financial markets. However, government should provide an environment that is 
conducive to the development of financial markets and set the operational framework 
for financial institutions that use public funds. Day to day political interference is 
detrimental. Political support and objectives must rather be embodied in the institution’s 
purpose and policies. Operational autonomy is then the only approach that can be 
considered. 
B. Autonomy and governance 
This implies protection against political intrusion, which in turn requires a Board of 
Directors in which no government official is the chairperson, on which no elected 
officials should serve, and where members drawn from the private sector carry more 
weight than those drawn from the public sector. This approach mooted by Graham 
(1995) has an interesting twist. Consider the approach that one should have a link 
between ownership and governance, but also would like to get away from government 
interference. Thus, what we ask from government is to capitalise, but not to govern. If 
we expand ownership to the private sector, one surely will loose much of the 
development imperatives. Thus, ensure viable business with the current clientele end 
convince the government that their commitment is reflected in their hands-off 
approach! 
C. Institutional considerations 
South Africa is characterised by a multitude of uncoordinated public sector institutions 
with overlapping mandates and competencies. The creation of new, additional 
institutions should not be actively promoted, given existing limitations on human 
resources and other capacities. There also is a dire need to optimise cost effectiveness in 
the operations of financial institutions and to rationalise public institutions that serves 
the same clientele. Where applicable, therefore, existing institutional structures should 
be transformed to serve the needs of the reconstruction and development process. 
D. Flexibility 
As different circumstances prevail in different provinces, and due to the dynamic nature 
of developments in South Africa, institutions should be allowed the flexibility to focus 
on local circumstances, provided that they do so within a coherent framework. An 
expansion of this argument is that within the basic guidelines reflect the reality of 
context. 
E. Minimising systemic (DFS) and institutional (individual DFI) risk 
The prudent management of systemic risk requires that financial institutions manage 
diversified portfolios. The stability of the development finance system depends on development finance institutions spreading risk across different types of clients, 
different sectors and/or different geographic areas. The high potential for covariant risk, 
especially where institutions are locked into serving one sector (for example 
agriculture), should be mitigated by diversifying portfolios.  
Systemic risk is also related to funding structure (as reflected by balance-sheet ratios) 
and should be minimised, inter alia, by subjecting institutions to regulation and strict 
commercial principles. Cost recovery is central to commercial principles. Subsidy-
dependent entities should not be supported in the long term and subsidy support should 
be minimised in order to contain government fiscal exposure.  
Sound management information systems are critical to minimising institutional risk. 
DFIs must have accurate, timely and reliable financial information to be able to plan 
and measure performance and impact under various sectoral conditions and in dynamic 
financial markets and to take early, appropriate corrective actions. To the extent that 
DFIs make use of public resources, they need to comply with and report on the basis of 
specific standards, codes of conduct, disclosure and information requirements.  
F. Mobilising financial resources 
Commercial principles are essential to the financial and fiscal soundness of a 
development finance system. Innovative approaches to the mobilisation of funds to 
ensure less reliance on government contributions are needed. This could be achieved, 
for example, by an institution that has a strong deposit base, offering a wide range of 
deposit facilities throughout its branch network. The matching of financial instruments 
on the mobilisation and application side is part of a sound approach. 
G. Capitalisation 
Initial re-capitalisation should be done by the government (if necessary), with additions 
to capital limited to retained earnings and sales of shares to the public. The institution’s 
charter should specify its minimum capital ratio (for example for a financial institution). 
H. Allocation of resources 
DFIs should preferably function on the basis of pinpointed financial market failures and 
should design and use appropriate risk-sharing arrangements to maximise private sector 
financial involvement. They need to develop innovative financial mechanisms to 
address neglected or emerging markets (for example, the venture capital market).  
I. Loan policy 
Interest rate policies should be designed so that the DFI does not crowd out private 
sector involvement. An emphasis on portfolio diversification is appropriate, especially 
in rural areas, where non-farm rural enterprises should be regarded as just as important 
as farming enterprises, in order to decrease risk exposure. Explicit targeting should be 
avoided. Commercial short-term overdraft facilities should be incorporated into the loan 
portfolio to balance medium-term lending, along with remunerative government 
treasury bills up to a specified portion of its financial assets. This gives the institution 
the means to manage both risk and liquidity. 
J. Staffing 
A DFI requires an efficient employment policy of creating the right potential capacity, 
where no government interference is allowed in terms of placements and termination of 
employment, within acceptable national norms and rules as espoused by the national 
labour legislation. 
K. Decentralisation and incentive measures 
A branch-based approach should be followed, qualified by opening branches in phases, 
from part-time to full time, as the volume of transactions justifies it. Decentralised 
decision-making should prevail at branch level. Performance based remuneration and 
related bonus schemes should prevail for branch managers and relevant loan evaluation and collection personnel, based on criteria such as the number and volume of loans, 
loan recovery, and deposit mobilisation. Bonus schemes should only be triggered after 
meeting a high loan recovery standard. Transfer pricing incentives would be required to 
reward deposit mobilisation beyond that used to fund local loans. DFIs should 
furthermore provide the appropriate incentives and penalties to align the behaviour of 
their clients with market signals and principally real interest rates. Client-
responsiveness is also closely related to incentives and penalties. 
L. Transparency, measurement of performance and reporting 
State-owned institutions, especially financial institutions, should be at the forefront of 
disclosure. Accountability should include quarterly and independently audited annual 
reports issued to the public, specifying financial conditions truly and fairly. Reports 
should include balance sheets, income statements, source-and-application of funds 
statements, and additional tables showing the ageing of loan arrears by loan type, write-
offs, reserves and the market value of the investment portfolio. Most importantly, 
subsidy dependence indexes should be carried out yearly and must figure prominently 
in all annual reports. Price differentials between market prices and the pricing policy of 
the institution should be included in reports. Large exposures and large defaulters 
should be listed by name and not afforded the confidentiality that is appropriate for 
private banks and their clients. Specialised government supported institutions should 
clearly differentiate between those activities they execute as an agent for government 
and for which government should pay them, and those activities on which they should 
achieve full cost recovery.  
 
Following the private sector emphasis on reporting by companies to a level above 
financial reporting, e.g. the impact of the company's activities on the environment and 
contribution to social development, more and more pressure will be exerted on public 
sector entities to report in even more detail. Several innovative measurements already 
exist to measure outreach of development finance institutions and reliance on subsidies. 
The public and government would expect to be able to evaluate the level of investment 
needed of keeping the institution afloat compared to the resultant development 
performance of the institution. 
M. Co-ordination 
Experience in the current system and internationally suggests that the most efficient 
development impact is generally achieved where development investment occurs within 
a coherent and economically sustainable framework. This requires linkages between 
aspects like marketing and production and between investments in, for example, 
physical and social infrastructure. It also requires co-ordination between different state 
supported and owned institutions, as well as with the private sector, to ensure that no 
duplication of efforts and subsidies exist and that programmes are being executed 
comprehensively. 
N. Donor support (external) 
Donations (where received) should generally not be used to fund loans, but rather to 
build up human capital to manage credit risk intelligently. Important here is the 
implementation of a management information system that permits the tracking of loans 
on a weekly basis. Thus training, technical assistance and judicious support for 
computerisation are appropriate. Some of the institution's own funds should be 
committed to these endeavours as well, to ensure continued investment in management 
information systems upon donor withdrawal. Support should also not be directed at 
institutions, but at a sector. Therefore the same assistance should be possible through 
other institutions serving the same clients. If such an institution performed well, it could offer through its extensive rural branch 
network a range of deposit and savings services for the poor (as legitimate a demand 
as for loans) far better than many NGO programmes (Graham & Von Pischke, 1995). 
Moreover portfolio diversification and extensive branching would alleviate the 
covariant risk associated with site specific unit banks or limited reach NGOs. These 
institutions can serve an agricultural clientele that is rarely included in NGO 
portfolios. Reformed state-owned banks should be in a good position to serve the 
input suppliers and output buyers at the wholesale level who play such an important 
role in lending downstream to micro-entrepreneurs. In short, these banks could 
positively shape the market environment within which micro-enterprises operate. In 
the end reformed rural development banks and NGOs (as well as other financial 
service providers) could complement each other in rural areas. 
These reformed institutions would clearly not expand as rapidly as in their heyday of 
irresponsible portfolio growth. However, it is important that agricultural producers be 
relieved of any price penalisation and indeed benefit from well-designed government 
investments in human capital formation, agricultural research and related support 
services. Otherwise there will be an unfortunate tendency for policy makers to resort 
to subsidised credit through development banks as a convenient substitute for their 
failure to provide these services. In short, a threat will always exist for donors and the 
government to re-colonise these institutions with targeted loan programs and a 
political agenda, however, this is less likely in countries with intelligent agricultural 
support services and appropriate price policies (Graham, 1995). 
3.2.5 Mastering the system’s expansion 
Once the system is set up, one of the biggest difficulties is to resist pressure from the 
farmers, the government or the financial organisations to expand too rapidly, 
particularly when the first experiences have been successful. First, they must 
recognise that a successful start does not necessarily imply long-term viability, since 
many new systems tend to perform well in their first stages. Second, one should make 
sure that the conditions for long-term success are fulfilled (i.e. complete information 
about the rural people, training, quality of the staff, control capacity, etc.). It is 
advisable to establish a realistic plan for further expansion after two or three years of 
experimentation, which will be re-examined periodically depending on the results. 
3.2.6 Monitoring and evaluation 
A sound accounting system and a thorough analysis of the credit statistics and figures 
remain the basics for efficient monitoring and evaluation. The most important 
indicator of success is the loan recovery rate. Another critical viability indicator is the 
financial equilibrium of the local structures and of the system as a whole. There are 
other indicators which should be gathered, presented and discussed with the farmers. 
As an example, it was proposed in 1984 (during a conference in Lomé) that several 
simple indicators be systematically collected from COOPECs, as a starting point for 
national and international reviews. The following indicators still remain valid (data 
must always be calculated in the same manner to allow for comparisons from one year 
to the next): 
•  Number of local credit fund structures and their development 
•  Number of members, their development (in absolute figures, and compared with 
the number of potential members) and distinguishing shareholders and 
beneficiaries (users) •  Total savings, savings development, and contributions according to socio-
professional categories, the amounts and the numbers of accounts 
•  Savings per member (in current and inflation-adjusted currency) according to 
socio-professional categories and to status (shareholders or beneficiaries) 
•  Savings compared with monetary revenues or revenues of the main 
commercialised products (in broad terms) 
•  Proportion of credit operations compared with savings operations (amounts and 
number of operations per category) 
•  Overall outstanding payment rate per loan type and per socio-professional 
category of the beneficiary 
•  Credit utilisation (type of activity) per category 
•  Self-financing of the local financial structures, of the whole system and the 
management regulations to reach it 
•  Information on the poverty levels of clients and also the impact the financial 
services had on their socio-economic circumstances 
 
Collecting simple indicators is but a starting point before the more thorough 
evaluation. It is important to 
•  identify and know the promoters of any rural finance experience (the members 
and the external operators); 
•  identify the promoters’ real objectives (savings security, financial equilibrium, 
credit distribution, financing local development, etc.); 
•  acquire an accurate knowledge of the respective roles of the social groups 
involved in COOPECs or ROSCAs; 
•  measure the actual autonomy of the members. 
These elements allow a real evaluation to be conducted with the members with whom 
possible new orientations can be considered on and perhaps undertaken. 
4. Conclusion 
Financing the rural sector is becoming increasingly important. It makes it possible to 
reinforce the farmers’ organisations and their autonomy, as well as to promote 
agricultural and non-agricultural productive activities, including processing, 
craftworks, and services. 
Following the failures and poor results of both development banks and specialised 
banks (national banks of agricultural credit), two alternative formulas seem 
particularly promising: 
•  COOPECs (co-operatives for savings and credit) in which credit is generated only 
from savings previously collected by the members 
•  ROSCAs (informal or formal experiences of solidarity and rotating credit, which 
have existed for a long time in Africa tontines, stokvel, and also the Grameen 
Bank of Bangladesh) in which money may also come from external sources and 
where credit may precede savings 
Other formulas also offer interesting possibilities (seed stocks, grain banks and village 
development funds). 
Such diversity clearly shows that there is no universal panacea. In each situation, a 
system should be developed with the farmers after a sound analysis of the situation. 
Three golden rules may be set: 
•  The system must be socially appropriate and adapted to the farmers. •  Financial equilibrium must be targeted, which often implies relatively high 
interest rates in order to achieve long-term viability. 
•  No single institutional format will be appropriate for all circumstances. The 
market realities will dictate the best institutional solution. 
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